We study voluntary information exchange widely observed among traders in financial markets.
Introduction
There is extensive evidence of frequent communication among financial traders. The evidence suggests that traders voluntarily exchange information on the assets that they trade. A survey by Shiller and Pound (1989) demonstrates this: the authors survey 131 institutional investors in the NYSE and ask them what prompted their most recent stock purchase or sale. The majority asserts that it was their discussions with their peers.
The objective of this paper is to account for the frequent and voluntary information exchange observed in financial markets. The financial literature relating to information exchange, up until this date, has mainly focused on costly information acquisition, i.e. the literature has analyzed a particular form of information exchange in which information is priced and traded along with financial assets (see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1986 , 1988 , 1990 ), Diamond and Verrechia (1981) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Subrahmanyam (1991) ). In our paper, there is no monetary cost involved in the exchange of information.
The tradeoff in the context of voluntary information exchange is that traders find such exchange costly as they lose their monopoly on their private information while they find the exchange beneficial as it helps them better assess the risks related to the asset payoffs.
We perform our analysis in the context of an order driven market model, based on Kyle (1984 Kyle ( , 1985 , in which two disparately informed traders first decide whether or not to exchange information and then engage in trading. We first ask whether information exchange can ever increase the welfare of disparately informed traders, and if so, under which market conditions. We find that informed traders can indeed be better off by sharing information. This happens when the traders are risk averse and the market is opaque so that informed and uninformed trades are difficult to distinguish. The intuition behind this finding can be seen through a cost-benefit analysis of information exchange. The benefit of information sharing is simply the better assessment of asset payoff risks. The cost of sharing, on the other hand, follows from the decrease in the informational monopoly rents enjoyed by informed traders: Trading intensity increases with the quality of information, hence informed traders trade more aggressively after sharing information.
The higher the intensity of trading, the higher is the extent of information revealed through trades. As a consequence, more information is compounded into the asset price, hence the informational rents enjoyed by informed traders decrease. Given this basis for the cost-benefit of information exchange, it is easier to appreciate the roles of risk aversion and market transparency in the welfare analysis. Trading intensity increases with the level of risk-taking, hence more information is compounded into the price when traders, who are prone to risk-taking, share information. Moreover, such traders value better assessment of payoff risks less than risk averse ones. Therefore, risk aversion is necessary for information exchange to imply welfare improvement. Also, when the market is opaque, informed trades reveal little information, and as a consequence the cost of information exchange becomes negligible compared to its benefit. In summary, information exchange improves the welfare of informed traders provided that the market is opaque and the traders are risk averse.
The fact that information exchange can improve informed traders' welfare does not necessarily imply that these traders voluntarily exchange information. As in the games of prisoners' dilemma and tragedy of the commons, traders may actually dismiss the Pareto optimal (or superior) strategy and coordinate on a Pareto inferior one. The sociological literature demonstrates that in many circumstances individuals hoard information while it is in the collective interest to communicate. Bonacich (1990) calls this phenomenon a communication dilemma. Our financial market model also generates a communication dilemma. That is, there are circumstances in which informed traders actually choose not to exchange information even though it is beneficial for them to do so. This happens because each trader fears that others will hoard information while she discloses hers.
In light of the evidence of frequent communication in financial markets, the last result is rather discouraging. Therefore we offer a candidate resolution to the communication dilemma by introducing interpersonal (sociological) costs: We argue that the cost of hoarding information cannot be solely based on trading profits when others disclose their information. If the information exchange takes place among socially proximate traders, such as peers, colleagues, and friends, there is also an interpersonal cost for "cheating" on others. We should stress that this interpersonal cost does not categorically arise from hoarding information: when all decide to hoard, nobody bears an interpersonal cost. The interpersonal cost is only born by the trader who chooses to hoard her information while others disclose theirs. When we introduce such cost to our model, we indeed demonstrate that traders optimally choose to exchange information if (1) the "interpersonal cost of cheating" is sufficiently high, or (2) the interpersonal cost is non-zero and the market is sufficiently opaque. This resolves the communication dilemma and makes the Pareto superior strategy sustainable. What we offer as a resolution to the dilemma here, is also consistent Another candidate resolution to the communication dilemma comes in the form of (infinitely) repeated interactions. Repeated interactions allow traders to employ "carrot and stick strategies": those who share information can be rewarded by further information disclosures in later periods and those who hoard can be punished by not being disclosed any information in the future. We show that the disutility from future punishment can indeed make communication sustainable. In particular, we establish that information exchange is sustainable in equilibrium as long as the discount factor is non-zero and the market is sufficiently opaque. Compared to the concept of interpersonal costs, repeated interactions sustain communication in an economic environment where the costs and the benefits of information exchange are solely based on trading profits. Also, the repeated interaction argument does not go against the empirical evidence presented above: it is presumable that the likelihood of repeated interactions between traders increases by social proximity, which in turn suggests that communication would be more likely between socially proximate traders. This paper is related to several theoretical literatures. As we mentioned before, one is the literature on costly information acquisition in financial markets. Within this literature, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1991) are especially close to our work: both analyze costly information acquisition in the context of a Kyle model and both allow informed trader(s) to be risk averse. 1 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1991) show that the total expected utility of informed and uninformed traders can increase if an informed trader reveals her information to the uninformed traders. Informed trader's expected utility naturally decreases following the unilateral revelation of information. The differences in informed and uninformed traders' utilities before and after revelation determine the price of revealed information. In our model, the information exchange is bilateral: each informed trader has her own private signal. In comparison to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1991) , we not only show that information sharing can increase the total expected utility of traders but we also establish that the expected utility of each informed trader can increase after information sharing. This is why monetary compensation is not necessary to facilitate information exchange in the context of our model. Ozsoylev (2004 and 2005) analyze the economic and the financial implications of information sharing among socially proximate agents. A common feature of these studies is that information sharing is assumed to take place for exogenous reasons. That is, these studies do not explain why there is information sharing in the first place. In particular, Colla and Mele (2005) argue that information sharing considerably and consistently damages traders' welfare. They obtain this result through numerical simulations employing a dynamic Kyle model with risk neutral informed traders. Here, in a static Kyle 1 There is one informed trader in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) whereas Subrahmanyam (1991) allows for multiple informed traders.
model and its infinitely repeated version, we not only prove that information sharing indeed impairs risk neutral traders' welfare but we also establish that risk averse traders can be better off by sharing information. Moreover, our paper justifies information sharing among financial traders by making communication decisions endogenous, and doing so, it complements this recent theoretical literature. DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) also investigate the exchange and the aggregation of information in various economic settings and their model allows agents to optimally choose their communication strategies. However, their study employs non-Bayesian boundedly-rational agents while we assume Bayesian rationality in this paper. 2 Briefly, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 exhibits the model and provides the definition of equilibrium. The results of the equilibrium analysis are presented in Section 3: First, we give the market conditions under which information sharing is welfare improving for disparately informed traders. Then we obtain a prisoners' dilemma result by showing that traders can strategically choose not to share information even though it is in their collective interest to do so. We offer a candidate resolution to this dilemma by introducing interpersonal costs which penalize those who hoard information while others disclose. We also show that infinitely repeated interactions can sustain information sharing as an equilibrium outcome. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
The Model
The economy lasts for three periods. The periods are indexed by t = 0, 1, 2. Trade takes place in period 1, and the trading profits are consumed in period 2. The only traded asset in the economy is a risky one: the 2 We should also note the relation between our paper and the literature on asset price manipulation through disclosures (Allen and Gale (1992), Benabou and Laroque (1992) , Fishman and Hagerty (1995) , John and Naranayan (1997) , van Bommel (2003)).
Our paper abstracts from manipulative motives by assuming that each informed trader fully and truthfully discloses her private information once she chooses to make the disclosure. risky payoffṽ, realized in period 2, is a normal random variable. 3 There are three types of agents in the economy: two informed traders, indexed by i = 1, 2, a liquidity trader, and a (competitive) market maker.
Informed traders try to maximize their expected trading profits. The liquidity trader trades for reasons exogenous to the model. The market maker supplies against the aggregate demand of informed traders and liquidity trader. Each informed trader i observes the realization s i of a private signals i . We assume that trader i's signal communicates the risky payoff with some additive noise term u i , i.e.
The liquidity trader's risky asset demand is determined by the realization L of the random variableL. The random vector (ṽ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 ,L) is normally distributed with mean (0, 0, 0, 0) and a non-singular variance-
, where I 4 denotes the 4-dimensional identity matrix.
Period-0 Each informed trader decides whether to disclose her signal to the other informed trader.
?
• Nature chooses the realizations of risky asset payoff and signals. Period-2 The risky asset payoff is realized and consumption takes place. 
, the market maker announces the price P for the risky asset. In period 2, the risky asset 3 Throughout the text, we use the following convention: random variables are denoted with tilde (such asỹ), and the realizations of random variables are denoted without tilde (such as y).
payoffṽ is realized, and consumption takes place. 4 Informed traders are risk-averse. They have CARA utilities with common CARA coefficient A > 0, and they maximize their expected profits. The market maker is risk-neutral and chooses the price equal to the expected value of the risky asset conditional on her information in period 1. 5 Informed traders and market maker correctly anticipate each other's demand and pricing strategies. Also, market maker correctly anticipates whether one or both informed traders have disclosed information in period 0. We assume that the structure of the economy described above is common knowledge.
Let (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∈ {h, d} × {h, d} denote the communication strategy pair of agents 1 and 2. For i = 1, 2, δ i = h means that agent i is not disclosing her signal s i to agent j (i.e. hoarding her information) whereas δ i = d means that agent i is disclosing her signal. Formally, the period-1 information set of agent i is given by 
Note that the decisions regarding disclosures are made before the informed traders observe the realizations of their private signals. We assume this time line for the sake of tractability. A similar time line is employed in the models of endogenous information acquisition via trading (see, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Diamond and Verrechia (1981) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1986 , 1988 , 1990 ): in these models, the decisions regarding information sale and acquisition are made prior to the realization of information. 5 A Bertrand competition among market makers is the standard assumption to have zero expected profit for the market maker.
The equilibrium combines the period-0 optimal communication strategies and the period-1 optimal market strategy in the subgame perfect fashion: an equilibrium consists of informed traders' communica-
, and market maker's risky asset pricing strategy
In the forthcoming equilibrium analysis, we focus on the symmetric linear (δ 1 , δ 2 )-optimal market strategies so that informed traders' demand strategies satisfy
where
and market maker's pricing strategy satisfies
The restriction of equilibrium analysis to symmetric linear strategies is for the sake of tractability.
denotes the expectation prior to realizations of signalss 1 ands 2 .
Communication in Speculative Markets
Our analysis makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on market microstructure:
we let informed traders decide whether to exchange their information prior to trading round and hence examine incentive effects on communication in financial markets. Previous analyses have ignored voluntary information exchange via communication and mainly focused on information trading.
Agents face a dynamic game in our economy: first, a communication game, played between informed traders in period 0, and then a trading game, played between informed traders and market maker in period
As the equilibrium notion we employ for this economy is subgame perfect, we begin our analysis from the trading round, namely period 1.
Optimal Market Strategies
The communication round, i.e period 0, has four possible outcomes: (1) both informed traders disclose their information to each other, (2) both hoard their information, (3) trader 1 discloses hers while trader 2 keeps her information to herself, (4) trader 2 discloses while trader 1 hoards information. The first question we tackle is whether the trading round always reaches an equilibrium regardless of the outcome of the communication round. The following lemma shows that it does.
Proposition 1 For any given communication strategy pair
Although Lemma 1 establishes the existence of equilibrium in the trading round, it does not reveal anything regarding the functional form of (symmetric linear) optimal market strategies. The optimal market strategies can not be obtained in closed form in our model. This is due to the multiplicity of informed traders and their risk aversion. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Subrahmanyam (1991) also employ multiple risk averse informed traders in setups similar to ours and obtain equilibria with no closed-form solutions. Therefore, certain issues analyzed in their studies are dealt with simulations and numerical examples. We will also make use of simulations and numerical examples to better illustrate some of our results, however our model is sufficiently simple and well-behaved that we are not solely limited to simulations in our analysis.
Welfare Implications of Communication Strategies
In this section we analyze the ex-ante utilities of informed traders prior to trading. Our aim is to assess the welfare implications of different communication round outcomes for informed traders. In particular,
we will examine whether informed traders would ever be better off by sharing information rather than hoarding it, and if so, the market conditions under which this happens.
Before taking on these questions, we need to introduce some notation. We let
denote the period-1 expected utility of informed trader i for the communication strategy
where the risky asset demands (x 1 , x 2 ) and the risky asset price P are given by the (δ 1 , δ 2 )-optimal market strategy x
Also, we let E U i x 1 ,x 2 ,P ; δ 1 , δ 2 denote the period-0 expected utility of informed trader i for the communication strategy pair (δ 1 , δ 2 ) prior to the realizations of signalss 1 ,s 2 .
We first examine how risk aversion affects welfare implications of information exchange for informed
traders. The following proposition shows that risk aversion plays a critical role in this analysis. 
Proposition 2 Given communication strategy pairs
shows that information sharing is beneficial for the informed traders only if they are sufficiently risk averse.
Proposition 2 shows that informed traders, who are prone to risk-taking, are worse off by sharing information. This follows from two observations: First, new information is less valuable for traders, who are prone to risk-taking. Second, such traders act more aggressively in response to information, hence more information is compounded into the price, and, as a consequence, the profit margins of informed traders shrink. Therefore, information exchange implies welfare improvement only if traders are risk averse.
Next we examine how liquidity variance affects the welfare implications of information exchange.
Recall that, in the trading round, first liquidity trader and informed traders submit their orders and then market maker announces a price having observed the total order flow. As the liquidity variance increases, the changes in the total flow mostly reflect variations in liquidity orders rather than orders based on information, hence less information is inferred by the market maker. In other words, liquidity variance determines the level of market transparency; the market becomes opaque when the variance is high. 
Proposition 3 Given communication strategy pairs
The graph reveals that information sharing is beneficial for the informed traders if they are sufficiently risk averse and the liquidity is sufficiently volatile.
and the liquidity variance σ 2 L is sufficiently large, then
Proposition 3 shows that there are circumstances under which information sharing makes risk averse informed traders better off: this happens when the liquidity variance is sufficiently high, i.e. when the market is opaque. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Informed traders' expected utilities rely solely on their expected profits from trading, which in turn rely on the market maker's price announcement.
When information is shared, traders trade more aggressively and hence reveal more information to the market maker. This means lower profit margins for informed traders. However, when the market is opaque, trading orders reveal little information, and therefore the cost of information sharing is low. On the other hand, market transparency does not affect the benefit of information sharing, which is the better assessment of asset payoff risks. Due to this cost-benefit imbalance in an opaque market, information sharing improves the welfare of informed traders.
The Communication Dilemma
The previous section has established that risk averse informed traders are better off by sharing information when market is opaque. However, this does not necessarily mean that each trader's optimal communication strategy is to disclose information. As in the prisoner's dilemma game, we may end up having traders hoarding information even though it is beneficial for both to share. The following proposition shows that this is indeed the case for some parameter values.
Proposition 4 Given communication strategy pairs
(δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, let the corresponding (δ 1 , δ 2 )-optimal market strategies x δ 1 δ 2 1 (s 1 ,s 2 ), x δ 1 δ 2 2 (s 1 ,s 2 ), P δ 1 δ 2 (X) be symmetric linear. There ex- ist parameter values (A, σ 2 v , σ 2 u , σ 2 L ) ∈ R 4 ++ such that (h, h
) is the unique equilibrium communication strategy pair even though the ex-ante utilities exhibit
Proposition 4 demonstrates that informed traders can indeed decide to hoard information even though sharing is Pareto superior. Following the sociological terminology, we name this outcome as communication dilemma. This dilemma is actually quite intuitive, because the best response of a trader to information disclosure should be to hoard information as, by doing so, she is benefitting from disclosed information and not losing monopoly on her own information. Thus, fearing that the other party will cheat and hoard information, both traders choose not to disclose in equilibrium. 
That is, either information sharing makes informed traders worse off compared to hoarding or there is a prisoners' dilemma in the sense that both traders hoarding information is the only equilibrium outcome even though information sharing is the Pareto superior option.
Sustaining Communication Through Interpersonal Costs
The sociological literature provides anecdotal and experimental evidence of communication dilemma in various contexts. 7 However, this dilemma is rather discouraging for us given the extensive evidence of frequent communication among financial traders. Here we offer a candidate resolution to this dilemma.
Up to this point, we have assumed that cost and benefit of information exchange are only based on trading profits. This assumption is plausible when both traders are disclosing or hoarding. However, when one hoards while other discloses information, the action of hoarder borders on cheating. In the case of socially proximate agents, among whom there would be repeated as well as non-financial interactions, such action would bring a disutility independent from profits based on trading. So, in this section, we introduce this disutility in the form of interpersonal (sociological) cost, denoted by C. When one hoards while the other party discloses information, the hoarder faces the additional disutility of C. The following reduced-form normal game for period-0 better illustrates the renewed payoffs of the communication game.
We should stress that the interpersonal cost is for cheating not just for hoarding: when both traders hoard, they bear no costs. So, we are not automatically forcing information sharing to be the optimal choice by introducing interpersonal costs. In fact, as previous sections have already demonstrated, information sharing is Pareto superior to both sides hoarding when market is opaque. Interpersonal cost only makes the Pareto superior communication strategy sustainable by taking away the counter party's cheating option.
The following proposition illustrates this in a formal manner. , and the y-axis stands for the minimum interpersonal cost C that sustains information sharing as an equilibrium
Proposition 5 Given communication strategy pairs
The graph reveals that the interpersonal cost required to sustain information sharing as an equilibrium outcome is small if the liquidity is sufficiently volatile.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 states that when the interpersonal cost C is sufficiently large, information sharing (i.e. disclosure on both sides) becomes an equilibrium outcome. Part (b) of the proposition additionally says that when market is opaque, the interpersonal cost needs not be large for information sharing to take place in equilibrium. To see the intuition for part (b) recall the discussion following Proposition 3:
when market is opaque the cost of information sharing based on expected profits from trade is already small. Thus, a small disutility in the form of interpersonal cost is enough to make trader turn away from cheating and be content with information sharing. take place when these managers are in the same city as they are physically and socially more proximate.
As interpersonal cost for cheating would presumably increase by social proximity, our model would also suggest communication to be more likely among socially proximate traders. 8 
Sustaining Communication Through Repeated Interactions
Another way to sustain communication among informed traders is to introduce repeated interactions between them. Repeated interactions allow traders to employ "carrot and stick strategies": those who share information can be rewarded by further information disclosures in later periods and those who hoard can be punished by not being disclosed any information in the future. The disutility from future punishment can make communication sustainable.
Let us now give a formal description of sustainable communication with infinitely repeated interactions. Consider the communication and trading game described in Section 2 to be the stage game of an 8 Recent experimental studies also implicate that interpersonal costs for cheating would increase by social proximity. For instance, Charness, Haruvy and Sonsino (forthcoming) show that many people show regard for others in the context of experiments conducted over the Internet in three continents. In particular, the authors show that a substantial minority makes choices that indicate positive reciprocity, and the proportion doing so increases as social proximity increases. 
normally distributed with mean (0, ..., 0, ...) and non-singular variance-covariance matrix  , and contingent pricing strategy P
∈ arg max
Now consider the following trigger strategy: disclose information in the first stage, disclose information if the opponent disclosed in the previous stage, hoard information forever if the opponent hoarded in the previous stage. Formally, the trigger strategy is given by δ i1 = d, and for T > 1,
It is straightforward to see that informed traders would disclose information forever if both play the trigger strategy.
Next we derive the condition under which both informed traders play the trigger strategy in equilibrium. Since all stages of the game are identical, informed traders'payoff matrix in the communication period of each stage is of the form trader 2
where E U i x 1 ,x 2 ,P ; δ 1 , δ 2 denotes the ex-ante expected utility of informed trader i for the communication strategy pair (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∈ {h, d} × {h, d} in the one-shot game described in Section 2. Suppose trader j plays the trigger strategy. Trader i's expected discounted present utility from playing trigger strategy is
. On the other hand, trader i's expected discounted present utility from any deviation is
Therefore both traders play the trigger strategy in equilibrium 9 if and only if for all i ∈ {1, 2}
The following proposition provides a sufficiency condition for the trigger strategy to be played by both informed traders in equilibrium. The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. The discount factor β determines the size of the disutility from punishment following hoarding information: the higher β is, the larger is the disutility from punishment. When market is opaque the cost of information sharing is already small (recall the discussion following Proposition 3). Therefore a small discount factor is sufficient to make communication sustainable when market is opaque. Figure 5 gives us some understanding of the size of discount factor that makes communication sustainable. 
Proposition 6 Given communication strategy pairs
(δ 1τ , δ 2τ ) ∞ τ =1 ∈ ∞ τ =1 {h, d}
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies voluntary information exchange widely observed among financial traders. In the context of a standard market microstructure model, based on Kyle (1984 Kyle ( , 1985 , we investigate whether or not disparately informed traders would ever voluntarily engage in information exchange. Our model generates several novel results:
• Information exchange improves informed traders' welfare provided that traders are risk averse and the market is sufficiently opaque.
• There are circumstances under which the equilibrium yields a prisoners' dilemma result: informed traders hoard information even though they would be better off by sharing.
• In the presence of interpersonal costs, which punish those who hoard information while others disclose, information exchange is sustainable in equilibrium. In particular, endogenous information exchange exists if (i) the interpersonal cost of cheating is high, or (ii) the interpersonal cost is nonzero and the market is sufficiently opaque.
• Repeated interactions also sustain, in equilibrium, information exchange provided that the discount factor is non-zero and the market is sufficiently opaque.
The latter two results are broadly consistent with the recent empirical and experimental evidence which suggest information exchange is more likely between socially proximate traders: both the interpersonal cost of information hoarding and the likelihood of repeated interactions, presumably, increase as the social distance decreases.
There are a number of directions in which our study can be furthered. The model of the current paper assumes that informed traders are homogenous in the sense that they have the same coefficient of risk aversion and they all possess information of same precision. When the homogeneity assumption is dropped, information exchange can still be facilitated if traders are allowed to add noise to the information they exchange. In particular, traders, who are more prone to risk-taking and possess information of higher precision, would participate in exchange by sharing a noisy version of their private information. However, the introduction of heterogeneity comes at a substantial cost in terms of tractability and comprehensibility.
The current model also abstracts from certain incentive problems involved in information exchange since traders truthfully represent their information by assumption. 
where I is the identity matrix. 10
Appendix B: Proofs
if and only if
where the parameters β
10 A proof for this lemma is provided in Subrahmanyam (1991).
2 λ
Proof.
is symmetric linear if and only if there exist β dd ∈ R and λ dd ∈ R such that
Note thats 1 +s 2 is a sufficient statistic for the pair of signals (s 1 ,s 2 ) in the sense that conditional distribution of risky payoffṽ given (s 1 ,s 2 ) is the same as the conditional distribution ofṽ giveñ s 1 +s 2 . Therefore the expected utility of informed trader i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is given by
wherep and x i denote the risky asset price and trader i's risky asset demand, respectively. (2a)- (2b) and (3) imply that
Using Lemma 2 and Lemma 1, maximization problem (4) can be rewritten as
which further reduces to
The f.o.c. (first order condition) for maximization problem (5) is given by
which implies
The s.o.c. (second order condition) for (5) is
(2a) and (6) together yield
Following (2a)-(2b), we also have
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2. Thus from (9) 
As the information set of trader i, i ∈ {1, 2}, only consists of s j , it is straightforward to observe that
Given the communication strategy pair (0, 0), trader i's maximization problem is given by
Following Lemma 1, (13) can be equivalently rewritten as
which, using (11a)-(11b) and Lemma 2, further reduces to
The f.o.c. for (14) implies that
whereas the s.o.c. for (14) yields
Following (11a), (12) and (15),
From (11a)-(11b), we also have
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2. This further implies
(12), (16), (17), and (19) together yield the desired result.
By definition, an
linear if and only if there exist α hd i ∈ R, β hd i ∈ R, i ∈ {1, 2}, and λ hd ∈ R such that
Given the communication strategy pair (h, d), trader 1's maximization problem is given by
On the other hand, as the information set of trader 2 only consists of s 2 , we immediately have
Trader 2's maximization problem is given by
Using (20a)- (20c), (22), Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we observe that (21) and (23) imply
The f.o.c. for (24a) implies
while the s.o.c. is given by
Comparing (25) with (20a) we obtain
On the other hand, the f.o.c for (24b) yields
and comparing with (20b) we get
The s.o.c for (24b) is given by
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2. From (9), we obtain 4. This immediately follows from symmetry.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, let us prove that a (d, d)-optimal market strategy exists. To that end, it suffices to show that there exist real numbersλ dd andβ dd which satisfy the conditions given in Lemma 4 (i.e. the conditions in bullet 1). Eliminating β dd to solve for λ dd yields a fifth degree polynomial in λ dd equal to zero, say f (λ dd ). After long but straightforward manipulations, one obtains lim
Then real numbersλ dd > 0 andβ dd satisfy all the conditions in bullet 1 of Lemma 4.
Second, we prove that an (h, h)-optimal market strategy exists. To that end, it suffices to show that there exist real numbersλ hh andβ hh which satisfy the conditions given in Lemma 4 (i.e. the conditions in bullet 2). Eliminating λ hh to solve for β hh yields a quotient of polynomials in β hh equal to zero, say g(β hh ). The numerator of g(β hh ) is of degree 5 in β hh and the denominator is of degree 4. For β hh > 0 the denominator is positive, and taking limits of the numerator of g(β hh ) as β hh tends to 0 and ∞ yields that the numerator has a positive root. This in turn implies that g(β hh ) has a positive rootβ hh . Let
Then real numbersλ hh > 0 andβ hh > 0 satisfy all the conditions in bullet 2 of Lemma 4. Note that the existence of a (d, h)-optimal market strategy follows from the existence of an (h, d)-optimal market strategy through symmetry. 
Lemma 5 Given communication strategy pairs
Lengthy but straightforward manipulations on conditions given in Lemma 4 also yield
On the other hand, from Lemma 5 we have 
From (39), it is straightforward to see that (h, h) is the unique equilibrium communication strategy pair.
We obtain this result (i.e. the communication dilemma) for other parameter values as well (see Figure   4 ).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Part (a) is straightforward.
Using Lemma 4, we obtain
and
Then Lemma 5 together with (40) and (41) yield 
